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In the 2012 season finale of the television show Political Animals, the secretary
of state, Elaine Barrish (Sigourney Weaver), learns that the vice president,
Fred Collier (Dylan Baker), has asked the chief justice of the United States
Supreme Court to administer the oath of office after Air Force One—with
the president on board—goes down in French waters. Barrish, trained as a
lawyer, is incredulous; why, she asks, is Collier not adhering to the Twentyfifth Amendment to the United States Constitution? An advisor wonders
aloud about the amendment and she explains—for his benefit and ours—the
constitutional procedure by which the vice president may inform congressional
leaders that, with the support of a majority of the cabinet, he or she is assuming
the powers of the presidency because the president has become incapacitated.1
Barrish proceeds to persuade Collier that he should adhere to this procedure,
secure the cabinet’s support, and not risk a constitutional crisis that would
cloud his presumed tenure in office.
Perhaps needless to say, these scenes are like candy to a constitutional law
professor. This is the stuff we rarely address in the basic con law course taught
in most American law schools, the majority of which focuses on what Sanford
Levinson, in Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance, calls the
“Constitution of Conversation”—those provisions of the U.S. Constitution,
such as the commerce clause and the due process clause, whose textual meaning
is subject to seemingly endless debate among commentators, judges, lawyers
and members of the public. Framed focuses instead on the provisions about
which there is rarely any real debate about textual meaning—what Levinson
calls the “Constitution of Settlement,” those self-enforcing constitutional
provisions that “appear to be sufficiently obvious in their meaning that they
require no adjudication at all” (22).
It is this lack of debate over legal meaning that makes understanding the
dictates and implications of the Constitution of Settlement so critical for
Lawrence Friedman is a Professor of Law, New England School of Law. Thanks to my friends
and colleagues Vic Hansen, Jordy Singer, Louis Schulze and Carol Steiker for their comments
and suggestions.
1.

See U.S. Const., amend XXV, § 4.

Journal of Legal Education, Volume 63, Number 2 (November 2013)

360

Journal of Legal Education

Levinson. In his view, the Constitution of Settlement is essentially responsible
for the current crisis of governance in the United States; the “major premise”
of Framed is “that there is a connection between the perceived deficiencies
of contemporary government and formal constitutions” (5). Levinson argues
that the rules embraced by the Constitution of Settlement have led to the
dysfunction that describes national politics in the United States today, with a
federal government equipped to do little more than lurch from crisis to crisis
between bouts of partisan bickering. To make matters worse, the institutional
deficiencies at the federal level created by the Constitution of Settlement are
effectively immune to change, given that the courts rarely have occasion to
address them and amending the constitution is close to impossible.
To illustrate the force the Constitution of Settlement exerts on our
politics and governance at the federal level, consider again the Twenty-fifth
Amendment, the provision concerning presidential succession that became a
plot point in Political Animals. The amendment exemplifies the central theme of
Framed: the Constitution of Settlement forces some options and curtails others
without accounting for the needs and exigencies of modern governance. Its
framers designed the amendment to address the “Kennedy problem”—that is,
what might have happened if President John F. Kennedy “had survived for six
weeks while slipping in and out of consciousness” (219). And the procedure
outlined in the amendment seems adequate: should a president be shot and
wounded in such a way that he loses consciousness, we know how to keep the
office of the president running. But the amendment tells us nothing about a
situation in which, say, a president suffers from a progressive mental illness, like
Alzheimer’s disease. As Levinson notes, President Ronald Reagan likely was
afflicted with that disease “no later than sometime in his second term in office,”
yet “there was never a hint of recourse to the Twenty-fifth Amendment, which
suggests that it will take something truly extraordinary for the amendment to
take on real life, as it were” (220).
Levinson’s point is not that the meaning of the Twenty-fifth Amendment
is in any way unclear. Rather, he is arguing that its utility is fairly limited,
neglecting as it does to take account of the ways in which a president is most
likely to become disabled while in office and require removal. The amendment
simply does not contemplate circumstances beyond its settled meaning.
And we can’t place the blame for this one on the framers of the original
Constitution—the amendment was ratified in 1967, by which time the possible
means by which a President could become unfit for office surely included more
than the risk of an assassin’s bullet.
The Twenty-fifth is not the only constitutional amendment concerning the
executive branch that gets Levinson’s attention in Framed. He asks: what if it
would be a good idea for a particular president to stick around beyond two terms
of four years apiece? The problem is not the term limitation per se “but instead
that [the amendment] admits of no potential exceptions” (212). And, partly as
a result of the Twenty-second amendment, the time in which a president can
influence the direction of at least domestic policy has been reduced to about
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two years—until the first major congressional election of his first term. “Sooner
or later,” the journalist Ryan Lizza has concluded, “every reelected president
confronts the frustration lurking in a second term: reelection to power does
not necessarily grant more of it.”2 Further, as Levinson observes, “even if
one likes the Twenty-second Amendment as a valuable protection against
demagogues, it might be even better if, for example, Congress could suspend
the amendment by a two-thirds vote when ‘the national interest requires it’”
(212).
Levinson argues, moreover, that just as the Constitution of Settlement
forecloses possibilities for responsible governance, it serves to thwart basic
democratic impulses. Consider in this regard the method by which we choose
our presidents. The Electoral College represents the framers’ “strong preference
for representative government over any kind of direct decisionmaking by the
people” (179). They determined it would be better for the chief executive to be
elected, as Alexander Hamilton explained, not by the people but by “[a] small
number of persons, selected by their fellow citizens from the general mass,
[who] will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite
to so complicated an investigation.”3
Hamilton’s is not the only explanation for the Electoral College. Relying
upon the work of Akhil Amar,4 Levinson explains that, in 1787—a time when
organized political parties did not exist as they do today—there was an
information problem which recommended a system that turned on the popular
election of local elites to serve as presidential electors. Further, direct election
of the president by the people would have eliminated the benefit to the slave
states that secured their commitment to the new constitution: the Three-fifths
Compromise, which increased these states’ populations and therefore their
representation in Congress, not only “gave slaveowners extra influence in the
House of Representatives,” but “a bonus when choosing the president,” which
became a “Jim Crow” bonus after the Civil War (183).
Regardless of its origins and intended function, the Electoral College
undeniably diminishes the scope of American democracy. The mechanism
of choosing the president through the college gives to states the power to
determine the method by which electors will be selected, and the states in the
late 18th century—like most today—were guided by partisan interest. “Among
other things,” Levinson writes, the Electoral College created “an incentive [for
states] to adopt the winner-take-all method of allocating electoral votes, lest
they in effect lose clout in the final vote by more accurately reflecting the actual
distribution of the local citizenry’s preferences” (183).
2.

Ryan Lizza, The Second Term: What would Obama do if reelected?, The New Yorker, June
18, 2012, at 46.

3.

The Federalist No. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., The New
American Library 1961).

4.

See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (Random House 2005).

362

Journal of Legal Education

It should come as no surprise, moreover, that the Electoral College is in
its way a very peculiar institution. Levinson notes that “no foreign country
chooses its presidents in such a byzantine way” and, closer to home, “all
American states elect their governors by direct vote of the people” (189). In
this respect, as in many others, Levinson seeks to contrast the decisions of the
framers of the original constitution with the decisions of the framers of the
50 other constitutions that fill out the subtitle of Framed. He believes we can
learn a great deal from the varied structural and institutional choices reflected
in the state constitutions, and takes seriously the notion that these documents
should be accorded respect both as constitutions and as alternative models of
constitutional democracy.5
The direct election of chief executives is just one example of state
constitutional difference; throughout Framed Levinson discusses other ways in
which state governments differ from their federal counterpart. For instance,
in most states the attorney general is independent of the governor: more than
40 states elect their attorneys general, in a few the state legislature selects the
attorney general, and Tennessee Supreme Court appoints that state’s attorney
general. And “even though New Jersey attorneys general are appointed by the
governor,” Levinson notes, “they do not, unlike other executive branch officials
in that state, serve at the pleasure of the chief executive. Once appointed, the
attorney general is entitled to remain in office for the term of the governor”
(240). What most state constitutions create, then, is the possibility of tension
between a governor and an attorney general—and, of course, of additional
oversight. This is so even when the two come from the same party, should the
attorney general harbor gubernatorial ambitions. The relationship between
presidents and the attorneys general they have appointed, on the other hand,
appears to create incentives for the latter “to subordinate their independent
judgment to the political imperatives of the White House” (240-41).
Framed’s analysis of the Constitution of Settlement is not limited to
questions about the constitutional configuration of and limitations on the
executive branch. Levinson is convinced that the framers of the original
constitution thoroughly boxed us in. For instance, “[w]e have a constitution
filled with veto points, and among the most important of these is the ability
of … [the] Senate to kill any and all legislation it finds unacceptable” (47).
Thus the very accountability mechanisms that the Constitution of Settlement
firmly establishes also “may assure the near inability to make decisions at all
about important issues of public policy” (50). And, to make matters worse,
the phenomenal rise of political parties, which the framers of the original
5.
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constitution could scarcely have contemplated, has made the institutional
structures they designed into nearly-perfect machines for preserving the status
quo. There is more—much more—in Framed dissecting the Constitution of
Settlement, but these examples convey the breadth of Levinson’s criticism.
Assuming Levinson is right about the Constitution of Settlement—and he
does score some points—what can be done? Elections are probably not the
answer: he demonstrates that, thanks to the provisions in the Constitution of
Settlement that dictate how our representatives shall be elected, the weight of
an individual’s vote is more a function of geography than equity, “determined
by whether you happen to live in a district composed overwhelmingly of
adult retirees or in a bedroom suburb where half the population is too young
to vote” (108). In this way national elections are distorted, according more
power to some citizens and less to others depending upon factors—like where
one chooses to live—that most of us would probably regard as illegitimate.
As Levinson argued in an earlier book, Our Undemocratic Constitution,6 ordinary
politics cannot solve the larger problems of governance that the Constitution
of Settlement creates; he accordingly repeats in Framed the call for a “new
constitutional convention, one that could engage in a comprehensive overview
of the U.S. Constitution and the utility of its many provisions to 21st century
Americans” (391).
Mindful of the “discussions with family and friends” that revealed doubts
about the prospect of a new constitutional convention, Levinson anticipates
most readers will reflexively reject such a proposal, if only because “they
are basically terrified of what might happen if their fellow citizens, however
selected, actually embarked on serious reflection about the Constitution with
the possibility of changing it should they find it inadequate” (392). He could
be right about this, yet it’s worth noting (and Levinson does) that such anxiety
does not prevent many citizens from participating in the processes of state
constitutional change—49 states, after all, have adopted some means through
which citizens can effect constitutional change and nearly every state election
brings with it proposals for new amendments. As in so many other areas, the
difficulty in amending the U.S. Constitution makes it an outlier among the 51
American constitutions.
Another serious obstacle to a new federal constitutional convention is
complacency among the citizenry—the view that no constitutional change
is necessary because our political-governmental system, despite its many
idiosyncrasies, works just fine most of the time. The power of Levinson’s book
as a call to action—to persuade readers that modern problems of governance
in the United States may be traced to constitutional decisions the framers
necessarily tailored to the needs of 1787—depends upon readers sharing in
the belief that there are indeed problems of governance that we should be
addressing, and soon. If you don’t believe that contemporary American
politics, at least at the federal level, has become unremittingly dysfunctional,
6.
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you’re likely not going to be supportive of a proposal for a new constitutional
convention.
That the prospect of a new federal constitutional convention seems so
remote may help to explain why the public and the commentariat focus much
of their attention, much of the time, on the Constitution of Conversation.
In the constitutional provisions that embrace some of the framers’ highest
aspirations—for due process, equality, and the freedom of expression—lay a
world of interpretive possibility unavailable in the Constitution of Settlement.
This possibility for change underlies, for example, the popularity of efforts to
address the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Citizens United case,7 involving
the limits government can place on corporate political speech. That decision
has become a symbol of the corrosive influence of money on politics and,
because it springs from the Constitution of Conversation, many people believe
something can be done about it: free speech being a contestable proposition,
there are more than a few avenues for doctrinal evolution available to a future
Supreme Court concerned about the effects of uncabined corporate political
speech.
This is not to say that convincing the Court to reconsider Citizens United
should be seen as a simple task—except, perhaps, as compared to convincing
a majority of Americans that a new constitutional convention is in order.
Our faith in and allegiance to the constitution of 1787 knows no bounds.
Partisan political fighting and the constraints imposed by the Constitution of
Settlement have been set aside in recent memory only in the face of national
emergencies—the attacks of September 11 and the financial crisis of 2008, both
of which required immediate action by the federal government—and even then
in relatively limited fashion. Support for a new constitutional convention might
not take hold absent a disaster of such magnitude that it makes transparent the
cramped ability of our federal government actually to govern. Only in that
unfortunate circumstance are we likely to appreciate Levinson’s counsel: to
revisit the deal to which the framers of the original constitution agreed and
take a good look at the other 50 American constitutions, to see what lessons
we can learn from the laboratories of democracy that together comprise the
United States.
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